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Abstract: In 1970 Robert J. White (1926-2010) tried to transplant 
the head of a Rhesus monkey into another monkey’s body. He was in-
spired by the work of a Russian scientist, Vladimir Demikhov (1916-
1998), who had conducted similar experiments in dogs. Both Demikhov 
and White have been successful pioneers of organ transplantation, but 
their scientific attempts to transplant heads of mammals are often remem-
bered as infamous. Both scientists encountered important difficulties in 
such experiments, including their incapacity to link the spinal cord, which 
ended up by creating quadriplegic animals. In 2013, neurosurgeon Sergio 
Canavero claimed his capacity and plan to carry out the first human head 
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transplantation. According to Canavero, spinal linkage offers now the 
possibility of successfully transplanting the head and, by doing so, circun-
venting many of the somatic diseases afflicting human beings. In this ar-
ticle, we anticipate and discuss some ethical problems associated with the 
potential practice of human head transplants, and we consider how 
the possibility of a head transplant deals with our long-held metaphysical 
views on personal identity. Finally, we resolve for a moratorium of head 
transplants due to its lack of biomedical consensus.
Keywords: head transplant, ethics, yuck factor, personal identity.
1. HEAD TRANSPLANTATION: A HISTORY OF INFAMY
Cephalosomatic anastomosis (CSA) is the surgical transfer of a healthy 
head to a decapitated body. According to Dr. Sergio Canavero, this 
procedure, most commonly known as “head transplant” or “whole body 
transplant” –depending on who are identified as donor and recipient–, is 
becoming a feasible intervention once its greatest technical hurdle, the 
reconnection of the donor’s and recipient’s spinal cords, could be over-
come. The procedure would involve a patient suffering from an incurable 
medical condition but with a healthy and functioning head and brain –
arguably the recipient–, and a person who has been declared brain-dead, 
but still has a healthy body –the donor. According to this understanding 
of the terms, the recipient receives a whole body transplant from a brain 
dead donor2.
The idea of transplanting human heads into decapitated bodies has 
interested scientists and doctors for over half a century. One of the mo-
tivations to consider such a complicated medical procedure is the oppor-
tunity it offers to help patients suffering from multiple organ failure or 
other chronic conditions, such as quadriplegia. The first experimental 
attempts to implant the head of a mammal into another individual were 
conducted by Russian surgeon Vladimir Demikhov. His consecutive 
successes in transplanting organs in dogs –he was the first to successfully 
transplant a dogs’ heart (1940) and lung (1947)– led him to attempt in 
2 Although we believe that “whole body transplant” is a more accurate description 
of the procedure under discussion, we will use “head transplant” to keep with the 
commonly held expression.
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1954 the graft of a living dog’s head into another’s dog neck. Demikhov 
successfully transplanted the head and forelegs of a smaller dog, called 
Shavka, onto the body of a bigger one, and called Brodyaga. They survived 
the procedure with complete mobility, but finally both died four days 
later. Supported by Stalin, Demikhov’s experimental head transplantation 
program produced a total of twenty animal transplants (See Langer 2011). 
Despite these arguably being his most complicated and impressive techni-
cal achievements, the international public opinion considered such ex-
periments abhorrent, resulting in Demikhov’s worldwide infamy and 
oblivion (Langer 2011).
The United States heard about the head transplants during the Cold 
War and started funding research for their own head transplants program. 
Cleveland-based neurosurgeon Robert White was the ideal person to lead 
the effort. He was a talented surgeon with a keen interest in experimental 
research. White and his colleagues at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Medicine in Cleveland, Ohio, were the first to accomplish the 
total isolation of the brain in an experimental animal (1963). White was 
also the first to successfully transplant and hypothermically store the brain 
of a dog in 1983. For these experimental results we have now a more 
accurate understanding of cerebral physiology and biochemistry at low 
temperatures, which is relevant for modern resuscitation techniques. More 
importantly, in 1970 White transplanted the entire head of a Rhesus 
monkey onto another monkey’s body (White 1999). The monkey had 
all sensory modalities completely functional, he could see, taste, smell… 
Nonetheless, White did not think to fuse the spinal cord due to the tech-
nical limitations of the day. The monkey survived the procedure and lived 
for several days. Despite these efforts and achievements, like Demikhov, 
White also fell from grace and was not entirely recognized for his scien-
tific merits, largely due to the ethical controversies raised by his primates 
experiments (Berko 2013).
Cephalosomatic anastomosis relies on the reconnection of the spinal 
cord. White reached the conclusion that a severed spinal cord cannot be 
reconnected, and that leaving the person paralyzed was an insurmountable 
obstacle for head transplantation. In 2013, Canavero explained how this 
difficulty could now be overcome (Canavero 2013). A combination of 
three modern technologies that were either not available or proved efficient 
at the time of Demikhov and White, could make head transplant a success 
during the first quarter of the 21st century, according to Canavero. First, 
Canavero proposes the use of a micro knife or ultra shape blade in clear 
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contrast from what happens in clinical spinal cord injury where gross dam-
age hinder regeneration. Over the years there have been great advances in 
human nerve repair but peripheral nerve injury in humans is often not 
optimal (Höke 2006). Nevertheless, theoretically speaking the application 
of this nano-knife would cause a critically lower cell-impact in the spinal 
cord section. Secondly, he considers the use of inorganic polymers, 
i.e.fusogens, that have the capacity to fuse severed nerves and immediately 
reconstitute cell membranes damaged by mechanical injury (Chang et al. 
2010; Canavero 2013). Thirdly, with the application of an hypothermia 
protocol he contends that the neurological damage can be reduced. And 
finally, Canavero believes there is no reason why such a patient would not 
be able to walk again within a year after the procedure, a process acceler-
ated by electrical stimulation straddling at the fusion point. (Canavero 2015).
The announcement by Canavero has been received with both optimism 
(Ren et al. 2014) and skepticism (Cartolovni and Spagnolo 2015, Caplan 
2015). On the one hand, optimistic voices such as that of Dr. Xiaoping 
Ren who has been surgically transplanting the heads of mice –until today 
he has performed more than one thousand transplants– declare head 
transplant in humans is eventually possible, although a very complex 
operation is required. Ren is based at the Harbin Medical University in 
China and is prepared to host Canavero and his team alongside a team of 
Chinese neurosurgeons lead by Ren himself to perform the operation in 
December 2017. 
In January 2016 Canavero working with other scientists, including 
Dr. Ren, from China and South Korea claims to have taken important 
steps toward the goal of head transplant after a series of experiments in 
animals (mice and monkeys) and human cadavers. The news has spread 
all over the world and several media reported it (Wong 2016). As we see 
below with previous announcements made by Canavero, Arthur Caplan, 
of the Division of Ethics at the NYU Langone Medical Center in New 
York is skeptical and said that the fact that Canavero has gone public 
before publishing the experiments in proper academic journals raised 
many eyebrows, “It’s science through public relations,” says Caplan. 
Other scientists, Thomas Cochrane, a neurologist at Harvard Medical 
School’s Centre for Bioethics, is positioned with Caplan and states that 
is at least unorthodox to make the announcement before presenting the 
results to the scientific community, and quoting him “As far as I can tell, 
that operation has mostly been about publicity rather than the production 
of good science.” (Wong 2016)
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To get an idea of this complicated operation it will involve a crew of 
150 medics (nurses included), between 36 and 80 hours long and of course 
it will be very expensive (around 15 million Euros). On the other hand, 
the skeptics raise ethical concerns and in particular how the body and 
brain will regain a healthy state. For instance, Arthur Caplan, this past 
year said in May (Caplan 2015) that this is an irresponsible operation, 
unscientific, utterly nonsense and ridiculous. According to Caplan, Ca-
navero based his reasons to attempt the head transplant only on some 
reports about nerve repair with special substances but at best they were 
preliminary because we do not know how to fix an injured spinal cord. 
Another issue pointed out by Caplan is that it is not as simple as transplant 
a head onto a new body. The mammal nervous system is bathed with 
chemicals and sends signals to the brain. A complete new head with a 
new brain could become “crazy” or demented because the neural inputs 
will be different. Our brains get used to the signals send by our bodies; 
in a new body it would be totally different.
Despite the clash of opinions from both sides of the debate, it is fair 
to say that experts of one stripe or another overlook the fact that there 
is no scientific impossibility to transplant a head onto a new body as 
the history of organ transplantations shows. It seems the norm for 
every new radical concept that receives a lot of attention to arouse a 
sharp division of opinion among expert commentators. It happened 
when Christiaan Barnard performed the world’s first human heart 
transplant in 1967. According to some experts, perhaps Dr. Barnard’s 
mayor medical contribution was his courage to proceed with the heart 
transplant at a time when other surgeons were happy enough to perform 
the operation only in animals pondering if it would be possible to 
transplant a human heart. However, we cannot know for sure the 
scientific viability of a human head transplant until it occurs. Criticism 
might be justified but the possibility of a human head transplant arises 
strong reactions in most of us and these are about the way we conceive 
ourselves; that it is the reason why we believe that the bioethical com-
munity needs to reflect on the conditions that makes a human head 
transplant morally repugnant or dubious, if there is something repugnant 
after all, to know the reason why we reject it morally and the way we 
can avoid it as well.
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2. ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE HEAD TRANSPLANT
By the time Demikhov and White’s surgical achievements were re-
jected by both the scientific community and the public opinion as outra-
geous, other transplant champions, such as Joseph E. Murray (first kidney 
transplant in 1954), Thomas Starz (first liver transplant in 1967), and 
Christiaan Barnard (first heart transplant in 1967), were extolled as world 
heroes. What are the unique concerns underlying head transplantation 
that makes it so different from the transplantation of other organs? What 
beliefs and fears can explain the historical infamy associated to head trans-
plantation? What are the specific ethical concerns raised by cephaloso-
matic anastomosis? 
The head is a unique part of the body in many respects. On the one 
hand, it is commonly believed to contain the organic structures support-
ing life and what makes it human. On the other, psychological identity 
is often thought to be a phenomenon supported by the brain, and indi-
vidual recognition relies on the facial muscles and skin. Does head trans-
plantation necessarily threaten the life of a whole body recipient and its 
chances to remain a human? Would that individual remain a person, and 
the same person?
In this paper we are arguing that the moral repugnancy generated by 
this procedure is linked to these two sorts of problems. On the one hand, 
head transplants raise questions about the boundaries of human life. 
Decapitation has been historically understood as a sufficient cause of 
death. Now, head transplants offer the puzzling possibility for decapi-
tated bodies, and decapitated heads to reconstitute a living human being. 
Can the recipient survive along the process? On the other hand, head 
transplants raise vexing questions about the identity and the individual-
ity of the subject resulting from such procedure: is the transplantee the 
same person as the former head’s owner? To what extent the former 
owner of the body survives the surgery? Although we believe these two 
problems may account for the moral repugnancy generated by head 
transplants, they certainly do not exhaust the challenges raised by this 
procedure. We are mentioning here some of them: As any innovative or 
experimental procedure, head transplantation needs to be subjected to all 
the requirements of the regulatory ethics paradigm, including appropri-
ate informed consent and benefit-risk analysis. Some specificities can be 
found here. People, who would agree to donate their internal organs, 
might have reasons not to donate their body for a whole body transplant. 
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Ordinary organ donors often give specific instructions not to donate 
parts of their body, such as their face or eyes, most likely due to concerns 
about privacy and a sense of identity ownership. It is uncertain how much 
weight individuals place on the whole body as the basis for the self, but 
visible parts of the body seem to be particularly sensitive from the point 
of view of the interest in preserving anonymity. This sort of concerns 
would justify specific consent requirements for whole body transplant. 
Assuming that the risk of undergoing such a complicated surgery is very 
high, head transplant would only be morally acceptable for cases where 
alternatives were nonexistent, making this intervention the last hope to 
save a life, re-establish health or alleviate unbearable suffering. Patients 
with life-threatening conditions such as multi-organ failure, severe forms 
of spinal muscular atrophy3, end-stage non-neurological degenerative 
diseases or terminal cancer should most probably go first. This being said, 
if this procedure became safe, it might eventually turn to be the standard 
of treatment for non life threatening conditions, such as transgender 
operations, or even become a powerful mechanism for biomedical en-
hancement. 
Other types of ethical implications of head transplant concern decision, 
freedom, responsibility and even intersubjectivity. With respect to deci-
sion it is better to focus on which type of decisions a given IRB (Institu-
tional Review Board) has to make when confronted with a case of head 
transplant. More on this in sections 6 and 7. Concerning freedom, we 
conceived freedom as the possibility of the patient to choose which treat-
ment is better for them. Responsibility is related to the consequences of 
the decision made by the patient and medical staff. And finally, intersub-
jectivity is the most thorny issue from our point of view. Because it has 
to do with how a patient who has received a head transplant is treated 
socially by his peers, family and society in general. You can think of many 
tricky situations. As an example, imagine that a recent head transplantee 
has the body some person recognizes to be the body of the one who killed 
that person’s son.
Finally, whole body transplants also raise an important question from 
the public policy perspective. In a context of organ shortage, the effi-
ciency of using one healthy body to save one person, when that same 
3 In June 2015, Canavero met a man who volunteered for the world’s first head 
transplant. A Russian, 30 year-old computer scientist suffering from Werdnig-Hoff-
mann disease.
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body could save several lives and increase the life expectancy and the 
quality of life of some others, is in doubt. We believe the types of ques-
tions outlined ought to be addressed before head transplantation becomes 
a practice. We will not deal with them any further in this paper, but we 
will focus on the two fundamental ones.
3. HEAD TRANSPLANT AND THE LIMITS OF LIFE AND DEATH
The hypothetical scenario of a head transplant generates important 
insights to our understanding of what life in general, and human life in 
particular, is. This is partly due to the fact that the technique would require 
severing the part of the body which not only has been believed to be es-
sential for organic integration, but also the center of consciousness, cogni-
tion and the self. Interestingly, both proponents and critics of brain death 
as a criterion for human death have referred to the decapitation analogy. 
Alexander Capron, one of the “intellectual parents” of brain death, has 
mentioned “physiological decapitation” as “perhaps the easiest way to 
think of” brain death [1999, 125]. According to him and other support-
ers of brain death, “brain death individuals are dead” is an idea often 
defended on the basis that brain death is a sort of physiological decapita-
tion. 
In 1970, Robert White transplanted the entire head of a Rhesus mon-
key onto another monkey’s decapitated body (White 1971). White did 
not fuse the spinal cord due to the technical limitations of the day, he 
claimed the monkey had functional sensory modalities, he could see, taste, 
smell… The monkey survived the procedure and lived for several days. 
It is rarely questioned that the head plays a necessary role in the mainte-
nance of physiological life in all chordates, including humans. Such belief 
accounts for the beheading being an archetypical way of causing death. 
Head transplants would challenge this traditional view, insofar as it 
promises the possibility of preserving –and even expanding– the life of a 
decapitated individual. What is the mechanism by which the head play 
such important role in preserving life? If a body could physiologically 
survive without a head, and a head survive after being separated from its 
original body, would the traditional belief about the vital role of the head 
still make sense? 
A closer look at contemporary medical practices shows that it is not 
so clear that head plays such a vital role. On the one hand, individuals 
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with a total and irreversible loss of brain functions can maintain sponta-
neous heartbeat and many other integrative functions of the organism as 
a whole for years and even decades, with the assistance of mechanical 
ventilation. Controversies around the vital status of so-called brain-dead 
individuals are not solved (Rodriguez-Arias 2017), and the objections 
against the mainstream view which equates brain death to human death 
are far beyond philosophy or religion: they are scientific (biological and 
medical). On the other hand, and this is even more problematic, the 
regulations of most developed countries accept that a person can be de-
clared dead on the basis of cardio-circulatory criteria alone, without any 
direct evidence that the individual has totally and irreversibly lost brain 
functioning. In that case, the assumption is that a prolonged loss of cir-
culation to the brain stem and its hemispheres necessary provokes total 
brain loss. 
4. HEAD TRANSPLANT AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
The philosophical problem of personal identity deals with questions 
such as What is ontologically necessary and sufficient for some past or 
even future “self” to be you? What makes who you are? What am I? 
When did I begin? and, of course, How to understand our identity over 
time? Contemporary debates on the metaphysics of personal identity 
have focused on its practical and moral dimension as well. They attempt 
to explain several conundrums that arise by virtue of humans being per-
sons but also moral selves. Personal identity matters for any ethical the-
ory because people often have an interest in remaining the same. In the 
case at hand, a head transplant may imply for an individual to “become 
another person” not recognized by others, which may have important 
implications for personal relationships. 
Some of the mainstream accounts in contemporary debate about 
personal identity take a very individual stance forgetting the influence 
that other people’s beliefs and attitudes have towards personal identity 
(Daniels 1988). And this leads us to another important issue: What role 
family, friends and society at large play in conceiving personal identity, 
principally, if you drastically change your identity by means of a head 
transplant? The possibility of human head transplant translates all these 
issues to a new level of inquiry. Consider this: if someone takes my arm, 
am I still the same individual? Almost everyone would agree that Iam 
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still the same person. The same with one leg, with both legs, with all 
limbs and with most, if not all, internal organs. Almost no one doubts 
that people with a heart transplanted are no longer the same and the one 
who doubts it is usually criticized as being superstitious. The announce-
ment of the attempt to carry out the first human “head transplant” has 
revived these and other issues that had troubled many philosophers 
throughout history and recent times (Locke 1836, Ch 27 S. 16; Perry 
1975 and Parfit 1984).
Of special interest here, as pointed by Canavero himself (2013), is the 
ethical dilemma raised by the head transplant in terms of biological iden-
tity. The resulting head transplant would create a “chimera” and a loved 
one (a husband or wife) could be in love with the personal identity as re-
flected by the “head” but, should he or she want to reproduce, the offspring 
would carry the genetic material of the donated body (donor person).
Biomedical advances have made it possible to successfully transplant 
kidneys, livers, hearts, lungs, limbs, uteruses or faces. A pressing question 
is: Would a head transplant constitute a qualitative change or moreover 
an ontological one? The possibility of a head transplant raises the tradi-
tional questions of where the self lies. To show how head transplants 
affect the problem of personal identity we need to draw the basic theo-
retical framework in which the problem of personal identity falls. 
In the Introduction of one of the most celebrated books in philosophy 
concerning personal identity, Derek Parfit (1984) declares that many of 
us think we understand what persons are. He claims that we do not and 
asks the following questions central to the metaphysical problem of per-
sonal identity:
What makes me the same person throughout my life and a different 
person from you?
What makes the individual identical to himself that allows, at the 
same time, be different from other individuals?
As you can imagine if the announcement of the first human head 
transplant becomes a reality another battery of questions portraying 
equally challenging ethical issues will be necessary to confront:
Where is the location of the mind? 
What is the physiological substrate of the mind? Is it the brain; is it 
the brain plus other body parts?
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Is the mind an emergent property of the interaction between both the 
body and brain?
and more importantly,
If scientists could transplant my head to another body, I would be 
he or he would be me?
These are difficult questions that philosophy has tried to answer for 
centuries. Although we will certainly not solve them here, we can an-
ticipate that the first brain transplantation might suddenly answer them.
Using traditional arguments in the debate on personal identity the 
philosopher Derek Parfit presents a classical distinction. There are two 
kinds of sameness or identity: qualitative identity and numerical identity. 
Following Parfit’s example (1984, p. 201) two white billiard balls are not 
numerically but qualitatively identical and if I paint one of these balls red 
it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it was. The red ball 
now and the white ball that I painted red are numerically identical.
Traditionally there are two criteria suggested for establishing per-
sonal identity. On the one hand the physical criterion and on the other 
the psychological criterion. The physical criterion of personal identity 
tries to find an answer to three questions: What is the nature of a person? 
What makes one person in two different time points the same person? 
What is involved in the continued existence of a person over time? In the 
following sections we would like to introduce briefly some issues concern-
ing the metaphysical problem of personal identity and how several core 
concepts such as unity, individual, identity and personhood relate and 
can be transformed with the possibility of a head transplant.
5.  METAPHYSICAL APPROACHES TO PERSONAL IDENTITY: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH AND SOMATIC APPROACH
The metaphysics of personal identity is concerned with a very im-
portant aspect: The question of persistence. The three questions pre-
sented above make up the persistence question. Each and every mate-
rial object, including persons, has persistence conditions. What is the 
ontological basis for the persistence of persons? From the physical cri-
terion is not the continued existence of the entire body, but the contin-
ued existence of enough brain to be the brain of a living person. For 
example, X today is one and the same person as Y in a past time if and 
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only if Y’s brain continued to exist and is now X’s brain. This view 
denies the hypothetical scenario of teletransportation. For advocates of 
the physical criterion teletransportation is not a way of travelling but of 
dying. The teletransportation is a thought experiment, one that generates 
intuitions or beliefs that those who believe in the physical criterion do 
not accept. Physical disintegration of the body and the brain within a 
scanner on Earth although recording all cells to create a replica on Mars 
is a way to interrupt the necessary and sufficient continuity for per-
sonal identity.
5.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
The psychological criterion is similar to the physical approach but this 
time is a kind of psychological continuity. The psychological approach 
focuses on the continuity of our experiences or memory. Perhaps because 
memory allows us to be aware of our identity over time. The personal 
identity problem in its modern form is first found in Locke’s ‘Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding’, where he suggested that our expe-
riences are those that provide the criterion of personal identity. The 
psychological criteria derived from Locke may be part of a correct view 
of personal identity but on its own it is not a plausible view. If we take 
only memory as a psychological criterion of personal identity this is too 
demanding. It would not be possible for someone to forget things he has 
done or experiences he has had. For example, right now, I do not remem-
ber where I left my keys but Iam still me. You can extend this exclusive 
criterion of experience-memory to cover such cases. It would be a revision 
of Locke’s argument. For Locke only X would be Y today 10 years after 
if X has a direct memory connection with Y. The revision of Locke’s 
argument would appeal to other facts besides direct memories. There are 
other direct psychological connections, for example, between the inten-
tions and the actions to take. Other connections are among beliefs, desires 
and other psychological states.
Parfit defines two general relations:
– psychological connectedness the holding of particular direct psy-
chological connections
– psychological continuity the holding of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness.
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According to Parfit personal identity per se is not what matters. Per-
sonal identity just involves certain kinds of connectedness and continuity 
and when this holds in a one-to-one manner these relations are what mat-
ters. As Marya Schechtman (1990) suggests, the question of Who am I? 
might be answered slightly differently by an amnesic patient and by a 
confused adolescent. The former is asking which history is a continuation 
of and the latter probably knows her own history but is asking which 
beliefs, desires etc. that seems to have are truly her own. So personal iden-
tity in the form of psychological continuity can be called, respectively, the 
question of reidentification and the question of self-knowledge. Our 
philosophical discussion on the possibility of a head transplant regarding 
its impact on the conception of personal identity from the psychological 
approach which differentiates two general relations according to Parfit, is 
generally considered to be concerned with the question of reidentification.
Parfit starts discussing his own version of the psychological continu-
ity with some fundamental definitions. Then, Parfit shows that none of 
these criteria, connectedness or continuity, that constitute psychological 
continuity –memory, connections between intentions and actions or 
temporal parts of psychological features– assumes any facts on personal 
identity. Parfit sees identity as a transitive relation but continuity is not. 
I can be connected to myself two days ago, but not too much connected 
to myself two years ago. In a nutshell, Parfit describes psychological 
continuity in terms of another relation, which he calls: Psychological 
connection (Parfit, 1984, 205-6). There is a psychological connection 
when a psychological state at a certain time is causally related in the ap-
propriate way to another psychological state at another certain time. In 
a way, if I believe something because you intended something, if I do 
something because you experienced it, if I remember something because 
you learned it, then you and I are psychologically connected. And is this 
psychological connection, or relation R, the one which is important 
rather than personal identity itself.
5.3. SOMATIC APPROACH
The somatic approach is similar to the physical criterion only that 
continuity is continuity of the body and not of a part of the body such 
as the brain. People would cease to exist if they lose or they cease to use 
some part of their bodies. The imagined case of teletransportation is in-
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conceivable for the advocates of the somatic approach. The somatic ap-
proach is pretty common sense at first glance, very intuitive. The so-
matic approach basically says you are identical to conditions of your body 
or the thinking animal you are. But as many thought experiments like 
teletransportation, body swapping cases etc. and not so imaginary cases 
like the possibility of head transplantation in humans, this makes the so-
matic approach very objectionable. Our approach is mainly analytical but 
other philosophers from other traditions could address the debate on the 
relationship between mind-body in different ways with different implica-
tions for the possibility of a head transplant. For example, Popper (but 
also Eccles) defends an interactionist theory of mind and to solve the 
mind-body problem he introduced the doctrine of the three worlds. Why 
three worlds rather than one? Because Popper believed that either mate-
rialist monism or any instantiation of the classical Cartesian dualism did 
not work. Against monism, he thought that monism is unable to account 
for the emergence of consciousness and the mind. And against dualism, 
he thought dualism is unable to account for its claim that the mind is some 
unique non-physical substance impossible to be accounted for in terms of 
natural selection since non-material substances cannot emerge out of ma-
terial objects and through natural selection. Popper also wanted to analyze 
the interaction among the material world (W1), mental processes (W2), 
and the cultural products of the human mind (W3). He really thought of 
the effects of linguistic, artistic, musical content and other various aspects 
of W3, on W1, working through W2. How to relate this position of 
Popper on the mind-body problem with the possibility of head transplant 
or for that matter those positions held by authors such as Searle, Bunge 
or Marcus Gabriel when each of them has a different approach to the 
mind-body problem? It is not our main objective to make here a review 
of the literature on the mind-body problem. Only to confront the main 
metaphysical intuition, say personal identity, with the possibility of a head 
transplant. For the interested reader we recommend Bunge (1980). 
Other well known philosophers with different approaches to the classical 
problem of the mind and its relation to the body are, among others, John 
Searle (1992), or Markus Gabriel (2015). It is orthogonal to the main 
topic of this paper, but we can point out very briefly some tenets of their 
respective positions to have a snapshot of how different ways of seeing the 
mind-body problem have different consequences for the idea of person-
hood in a head transplant. For example, Searle believes to have been offered 
a simple solution to the mind-body problem with his “biological natural-
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ism”. In his much celebrated work “The Rediscovery of the Mind” John 
Searle states: “the famous mind-body problem, the source of so much 
controversy over the past two millennia, has a simple solution.” (1992, 
1.) His proposal to solve the millennial mind-body problem is to acknowl-
edge that “Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological pro-
cesses in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.” (1992, 1). 
On his part, Markus Gabriel (2015) and his defense of hyperrealism 
suggests that there are different epistemic worlds or fields of sense. Besides 
the things that exist in the universe which are the proper study of science 
there is also a world of epistemic realities such as abstract objects, fairy 
tales, unicorns etc. For him, asking about the problem of mind in relation 
to matter is a misguided metaphysical question before we resolve what we 
are trying to mean by the different premises and terms.
5.4. THE FISSION PROBLEM
Within the somatic approach there is what is known in the literature 
as the fission problem. A series of imagined cases that if accepted present 
problems for the psychological criterion of personal identity.
Imagine, the following scenario:
A surgeon removes and divides my brain; the halves are then taken 
and will be transplanted into the bodies of two other persons. I share 
half of my brain with each of them, the fission outcomes body 1 and 
body 2, so they are both psychologically continuous with me and by the 
psychological criterion are identical with me.
Callosotomy or hemispherectomy involves the surgical transection of 
the corpus callosum, the bundle of cells connecting bidirectionally both 
hemispheres of a single brain; it was a treatment for epilepsy in the 50’s 
and 60’s (Gazzaniga, Bogen and Sperry 1962; Nagel 1971). However, 
fission cases assume the possibility of dividing subcortical structures of 
the lower brain which forms a single entity and this is not physically 
possible if you want to maintain higher order cortical functions. Nonethe-
less, the logical possibility of the fission cases is considered by many authors 
a theoretical challenge to personal identity. Should fission be an accept-
able thought experiment it presents problems for the psychological cri-
terion. The fission outcomes, body 1 and body 2 are not identical to each 
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other; they differ in spatio-temporal location and by the proviso of the 
psychological criterion that entails that a thing could be identical to two 
non-identical things which of course violates the transitivity relation of 
personal identity. Let us suppose a head transplant is possible. Given the 
theoretical framework of the metaphysics of personal identity reviewed 
above and conceding that the psychological criterion is the most plausible 
one, it is the continuity of our psychological experiences through mem-
ory as a criterion of personal identity, but now a crucial question arises. 
The resulting person of a head transplant: who would this person be?
It may seem that the psychological and physical criterion are in disa-
greement. The resulting person is psychologically continuous to the 
owner of the transplanted head but will not have the same body although 
as noted the physical criterion ought not to require the continued exist-
ence of the entire body. If the brain continues to exist and is the brain of 
a living person who is psychologically continuous with whom he was 
before, personal identity continues to exist. And this is true regardless of 
what happens to the rest of the body. However, it will be important what 
the new body is like. In contemporary cognitive science some researchers 
are even hinting at a possible paradigm shift in the study of the mind/
brain and refer to this new movement as “postcognitivist” where the 
body, and its sensorymotor systems, has a central place; meanwhile the 
traditional paradigm “cognitivism” (i.g. Chomsky, Neisser, Miller among 
others as mayor advocates) views the mind/brain as an information 
processing device and cognition refers to all the processes by which sen-
sory inputs from the world are manipulated, stored and used in order to 
produce intelligent behavior in analogy to a computer. “Poscognitivism” 
or more accurately “situated cognition” or “embodied cognition” (Gomi-
la and Calvo 2008) sees the mind/brain as embedded within the environ-
ment grounding cognition in sensory and motor systems and therefore 
the body seems to be vital to understand the mind. In some sense, in a 
head transplant operation if the new body is quite unlike the old body, 
“situated cognition” would assert that this would affect what a person 
could do and might thus indirectly lead to changes in psychology. So ac-
cording to situated cognition the possession of the right sort of psychol-
ogy requires the possession of the right sort of body. We wonder if an 
advocate of situated cognition would keep the idea of the continuity of 
personal identity in a head transplant where the body is not the same. 
However, the “situated cognition” or “embodied cognition” acknowl-
edges a more complex interaction between mind, brain and the environ-
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ment. Giovanna Colombetti (2014) develops an enactive view of how 
affected are part of the body and related to action dispositions that can 
shed light on how to maintain a fruitful dialogue between those who defend 
a pure computational perspective of the mind in which representations 
are manipulated, stored and use and those who champion the view that 
our brain states are shaped by development, the environment and learning.
6. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO HEAD TRANSPLANT
Before embarking in such an uncertain task like a head transplant, we 
should try or perform less drastic, dangerous or invasive interventions 
such as brain-machine interfaces to restore body movement. Research on 
brain-machine interfaces is yielding promising results on the possibility 
to restore movement in patients with spinal cord injuries, traumatic brain 
injuries, ALS disease, severe amputations, etc. These interventions are less 
drastic, less dangerous and have more reversible consequences than head 
dissection (Donoghue 2008). Head transplant would require an enormous 
amount of immunosuppression that the body might not support without 
causing cancer or kidney failure; it is an expected possibility. On the 
other hand, the public and media response could cause a big social alarm. 
The mere idea of trying a head transplant could scare people. This response 
could be mediated in large part by the “yuck factor” that lead to moral 
disapproval, moral outrage or moral disgust on people (Midgley 2000). 
It is a matter of philosophical controversy granting disgust the normative 
power to justify arguments in favor or against, but we need to recognize 
that disgust or the yuck factor serves as a social tool to accept or reject 
ideas. Irrespective of the value, good intentions and even the technologi-
cal feasibility of a head transplant, there is a visceral or gut reaction in all 
of us, more or less tamed, but nevertheless instinctive, to reject something 
because causes us (moral) disgust. And this instinctive reaction is clear 
and very strong when thinking about the possibility of a head transplant. 
7. DISCUSSION: FRANKENTEIN’S ALLEGORY
One of the first indisputable examples of art was found in the Stadel 
cave, Germany, (Conard 2003). It is an ivorine carved figurine of a lion-
man (or lioness woman). Its body is human but the head is leonine. Since 
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32.000 thousand years humanity is still fantasizing about combining 
different parts of the same species or different parts of different species. 
In 1818 Mary Shelley published Frankenstein, the story of a scientist who 
wants to create a perfect being but failes and creates a monster. This 
masterpiece of literature has been told over and over again in countless 
versions. It becomes entrenched in our collective imagination and scien-
tific mythology. Frankenstein seems to warn us that if we play God en-
gineering life the consequences will be disastrous. Yet Frankenstein’s 
story has a deeper meaning. Beyond the argument of playing God, 
Frankenstein’s story confronts us, like it or not, with the fact that science 
and technology someday will transform us. The replacement of Homo 
sapiens and the coming of post-humans or even transhumans (Buchanan 
2013; Savulescu, Meulen and Kahane 2011) is no longer in the realm of 
science-fiction. Engineering biotechnology is making planned and intel-
ligent design possible. Biologists and educators all over the world are 
fighting against the intelligent-design movement which opposes the teach-
ing of darwinian-wallacian evolution by natural selection in the educa-
tional system. For close to 4 billion years life have been subjected to the 
old regime of natural selection, but now hundreds of thousands of biolo-
gists and geneticists are manipulating life in the lab. Ironic as it seems 
biologists are right about the past, but defenders of intelligent-design 
movement are right about the future. Now humans have the techno-
logical power to transform the world and themselves. So the real questions 
facing us are, what do we want to become? and what identity do we want 
to have? seems to me that moral and ethical caveats aside the possibility 
of a head transplant do not matter too much for our long held intuitive 
muses about what personal identity really is. The real issue here is moral 
and ethical regarding the harm we can provoke to desperate people who 
want to recover their motor functions and well-being by means of a head 
transplant. By all ethical lights, a head transplant should be banned or 
subjected to a moratorium until consensual scientific evidence is found.
As of April 2018 there hasn’t been a human head transplant and prob-
ably there may never be. But Sergio Canavero and his Chinese colleague 
Xiaoping Ren now just say it´s imminent. But many bioethicists disagree 
and argue to stop paying attention and ignore this issue because if not we 
are contributing to a circus. This case does not represent innovative neu-
rosurgery, but blatant self-promotion. (See, Wolpe 2017 and the whole 
special issue number 4 of American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 
devoted to head transplants).
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